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Prolonging Life: 
A Traditional Interpretation 
Rev. Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., J.C.D., S.T.M. 
The author, director of the Center for Health Care Ethics at St. Louis 
University Medical Center, says that while writing this article, he benefitted 
greatly from the assistance and insights offered by Sister Jean Katherine 
de Blois, c.s.J., Ph. D., St. Louis University Medical School and Rev. 
Charles Bouchard, 0. P. , Aquinas Institute of Theology, St. Louis. 
In a recent article in this journal, I Professor William E. May of the 
Catholic University of America characterized my interpretation of Catholic 
Church teaching in regard to withholding and withdrawing life support as 
"mistaken, mischievous, erroneous, dangerously misleading seriously 
deficient". While this may not be apt language for debate within the 
Catholic tradition, the article does provide an occasion to further the search 
for truth. Seeking to fulfill this search in this article I shall explain briefly 
the essence of the disagreement, examine some of Professor May's 
assumptions , and demonstrate that the interpretation I present is in accord 
with the interpretation of Church teaching offered by recent and ancient 
authorities in medical ethics. 
The Disagreement 
Professor May states that the means to prolong life may be judged 
ordinary or extraordinary (proportionate or disproportionate) insofar as 
the means to prolong life do or do not impose a grave burden upon the 
subject or are useful or useless. 2 While I agree in general with this statement, 
in accord with the terminology utilized by the Bishops of the United States, J 
I prefer to use the term ineffective rather than useless to designate therapy 
which is extraordinary, that is , which is morally optional. The difference is 
more than a choice of words . Webster defines useless as "having or being of 
no use". Ineffective is defined "not producing an intended effect". A therapy 
may be useful in the sense that it produces an effect but ineffective because 
the effect produced was not intended . How this distinction applies to our 
study will be discussed later in this article. 4 Professor May emphasizes that 
medical treatment may be judged extraordinary or disproportionate and 
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hence not morally obligatory only if "objectively discernible features in the 
treatment itself . .. impose grave burdens on the person being treated or 
others".5 Thus, he would not allow for consideration of the medical 
(physical) condition of a patient which pre-exists the pathology to be 
treated. He maintains that only the effects of the therapy may be 
considered, without reference to the overall condition of the patient before 
he or she contracted the illness for which therapy is being evaluated. His 
motive for allowing only "objective features" to be used in the assessment of 
extraordinary means is expressed as follows: "Too often the judgment that 
a treatment is useless or excessively burdensome does not reflect serious 
consideration of the objectively discernible features ofthe treatment, but an 
expression of attitudes toward the life being treated". 6 On the other hand , 
the conviction of several others as well as myself,7 is that the teaching of the 
Church allows and requires an analysis of subjective factors which pre-exist 
the treatment, as well as objective factors , before a decision is made to 
utilize, withhold , or withdraw life support. Hence, I would maintain that 
subjective factors which pre-exist a fatal pathology and which are not 
caused by the fatal pathology, may be evaluated when determining whether 
the therapy to overcome or alleviate the pathology imposes a grave burden 
or is ineffective. These subjective factors concern the overall condition of 
the patient, not only the physiological function of the person, but also the 
social and spiritual functions . To put it another way, the health status of a 
person which pre-exists a fatal pathology, as well as the person's economic 
status, may be considered when assessing whether a medical therapy is 
burdensome or ineffective for a particular person. 
The need to consider the subjective and pre-existing factors of the person 
receiving treatment is evidenced, it seems, by the following statements of 
Church teaching: "But normally one is held to use only ordinary means 
- according to circumstances o/person. place. time. and culture - that is , 
means which do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. 8 How 
can one consider "the circumstances" without considering the overall 
condition of the person for whom therapy is contemplated? Another 
statement of Church teaching maintains: "In any case, it will be possible to 
make a correct judgment as to the means by studying the type of treatment 
to be used , its degree of complexity, or risk, its cost and the possibility of 
using it and comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, 
taking into account the state o/the sick person and his or her physical and 
moral resources. " 'I How is it possible to consider the "state ofthe sick person 
and his or her resources" if one doesn't consider the condition of the person 
which pre-exists the pathology? 
The fittingness of considering the subjective factors which pre-exist the 
pathology when making ethical decisions concerning life support was also 
affirmed by the Papal Council Cor Unum. When commenting upon the 
document of the Church, On Euthanasia. the Papal Council stated: 
The criteria whereby we can distinguish ex traordinary measures from ordinary 
measures are very many. They are applied according to each concrete case. Some 
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of them are objective: such as the nature of the measures proposed, how expensive 
they are, whether it is just to use them, and what the options of justice are in the 
matter of using them. Other criteria are subjective such as not giving certain 
patients psychological shocks, anxiety uneasiness and so on. It will always be a 
question , when deciding upon measures to be taken , of establishing to what extent 
the means to be used and the end being sought are proportionate. 
Among all the criteria f or decision. particular importance must be given to the 
quality of life to be saved or kept living by the therapy. 10 (emphasis added) 
This latter statement clearly allows for consideration of conditions pre-
existing a pathology and the application of means to resist it. While the 
statement of a Papal Council does not have the same authority as papal 
teaching, it usually expresses aptly the tradition of the Church. In sum, 
Church teaching seems to encourage the consideration of subjective factors 
which pre-exist a fatal pathology when evaluating the moral obligation to 
use or withhold a particular therapy. 
The Purpose of Life 
When assessing the ethical imperative to treat a fatal pathology, I assess 
the grave burden imposed by the therapy, as well as the ineffectiveness. But 
I consider these as proximate norms for assessing the therapy. Grave 
burden and ineffective therapy must have a more basic norm for evaluation. 
Thus, my interpretation of Catholic teaching is based upon the realization 
that any effort to prolong one's own life or the life of another must be 
evaluated in regard to the ultimate purpose of human life. Professor May 
objects to this interpretation. I I Certainly there are many worthwhile 
proximate goals in life. Health is one of them. But the pursuit of health 
should be directed to the ultimate goal of life. Prolonging life is not the 
ultimate nor absolute goal of life. 12 If it were, there would be a moral 
obligation to prolong human life under all circumstances. If human life 
were an absolute good , all discussion of proportionate and dispropor-
tionate means would be nugatory . In Catholic teaching, the goal of human 
life is eternal life. 13 In order to strive for eternal life, we must perform human 
acts, (acts of intellect and will) under the influence of charity . Acts of man 
(vegetative and animal acts) of themselves do not bespeak the power to 
strive for the goal of human life. 14 Hence, if medical therapy will not restore 
a person to a condition where human acts can be performed by the person, 
then that therapy would be ineffective or extraordinary. If the therapy 
would restore or maintain a person to a condition in which the person could 
strive for the purpose oflife only with excess burden, then it is extraordinary 
from a moral point of view. To see this point more clearly, let us consider 
the terms "proportionate" and "disproportionate", which have been 
recommended in place of the terms "ordinary and extraordinary" . 15 
Something cannot be judged "proportionate" or "disproportionate" unless 
in relation to a goal. When evaluating, (whether for oneself or for another) , 
whether or not the means to prolong life will be proportionate or 
disproportionate there must be some goal in mind. Is that goal merely 
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prolonging human life or is it prolonging life in order to attain eternal life? 
While prolonging human life more often than not contributes to striving for 
the purpose of life, there are some situations where this is not verified. When 
a goal is said to be proportionate or disproportionate then, the goal by 
which it is evaluated seems to be the ability to strive for eternal life. 
Statements from papal teaching seem to confirm the need to refer the 
moral evaluation of life support to our ultimate goal in life. Pius XII, for 
example, stated: "Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact 
subordinated to spiritual ends." The Document on Euthanasia stated: 
"Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in accord with God's plan. That 
life is entrusted to the individual as a good that must bear fruit here on 
earth, but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life." The Pontifical 
Council Cor Unum is even more specific in regard to the relationship 
between prolonging life and the purpose of life: "Life is a gift bestowed in 
order for men and women to accomplish a mission ... (this mission) 
involves duty to care for the body, its functions, its organs; ... to do 
everything one can to render oneself capable of attaining to God. This duty 
sometimes requires that we sacrifice health and life; our concern for them 
cannot allow us to deny the claim of superior values." The term "mission in 
life" used by the Pontifical Council seems to express quite adequately the 
idea I have expressed in the words "purpose of life". 
When discussing whether means to prolong life are ordinary or 
extraordinary, usually the discussion centers around the practice of 
medicine. The need to consider subjective factors pre-existing the onset of 
disease before recommending therapy is a consistent practice in medicine. 16 
While we shall examine explicitly the purpose of medicine later in the 
article,17 for now it suffices to realize that physicians always consider the 
overall condition of their patient before recommending therapy. In clinical 
situations, simply prolonging the life of a person is not the goal of medicine; 
persons with advanced Alzheimer's disease are not considered as apt 
recipients for heart transplants, even if they are otherwise in excellent 
physical condition. It would be inconsistent for the teaching ofthe Catholic 
Church in regard to prolonging life to be at odds with the ethical practice of 
medicine. 
Competent and Incompetent Persons 
Insofar as competent patients are concerned, that is, patients who are 
capable of making their own medical decisions, Professor May seems to 
have little difficulty allowing for the consideration of subjective or pre-
existing factors; that is for factors (whether physiological, intellectual, 
social, or psychological) which pre-exist the onset of a pathology for which 
therapy must be evaluated ethically. He affirms: "Competent persons have 
the right to refuse any "extraordinary" treatment, i.e., any treatment which 
is useless and burdensome."J 8 But in deciding that a treatment is useless or a 
burden, competent persons consider many subjective and pre-existing 
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factors. For example, what I decide in regard to suitable therapy will 
certainly depend upon my overall condition. If I am prolonging life through 
use of a ventilator, do I want to begin dialysis to overcome kidney failure? 
What will be my ability to function with and without the proposed 
treatment? Do I wish to devote my savings to treatment or to the welfare of 
my family? If the treatment is successful, will a pre-existing financial or 
nursing burden for my family be prolonged indefinitely? 
Professor May's problem with my interpretation seems to concern 
incompetent patients, that is, those patients who cannot make health care 
decisions for themselves . Therefore, the remainder of the article will 
consider decision-making for incompetent patients. Professor May 
expresses his concern for incompetent patients in the following passage: 
What is my problem with O'Rourke's interpretation? .. 1 think that O'Rourke 
errs gravely when he claims that a means is ineffective ... in helping a person strive 
for the spiritual purpose of life and that a means is ordinary precisely because it 
enables a person to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. Why do I think that 
O'Rourke errs here? Many people, including some seriously handicapped children 
and some elderly who are not 'with it' persons who are not actualy able to judge the 
truth or falsity of propositions or make free choices, are not capable of striving for 
the 'spiritual purpose' oflife. They cannot do so because in order to do so, a person 
must be able to make judgments and to make free choices. But those unfortunate 
human beings are still persons and it is good for them to be alive .. . My problem is 
that if this (O'Rourke's opinion) is correct, that the lives of countless severely 
handicapped persons, including infants and the elderly, are regarded as worthless. 
There are many such persons who are no longer capable or will never be capable of 
reaching life's spiritual goals ... But I submit they are still beings of moral worth, 
i.e., persons whose lives are irreplaceably precious and worthy of our respect and 
love." 
Capacity to Perform Human Acts 
I have quoted at length from Professor May's article because it 
demonstrates some erroneous assumptions which confuse the ethical 
assessment of life support. The first assumption is: That a person who is 
incapable of making medical decisions is incapable of performing human 
acts. A human act requires deliberation and choice (intellect and will), but 
there are various levels of human deliberation and choice and thus various 
capacities to perform human acts. A person who is incapable of making 
medical decisions for herself may still make choices about other aspects of 
her life. An apt analogy arises from the ability to make financial decisions. 
Simply because a person has a guardian appointed for financial affairs does 
not imply that the person is incapable of performing human acts, especially 
in regard to spiritual goods. Making medical decisions usually involves 
understanding various options for treatment, the cost involved, the 
alternative to treatment, the possibility of success, and the expected 
function of the person if the treatment is successful or if the treatment is not 
utilized. One could be morally and legally incompetent to make medical 
decisions and still be striving for the purpose of life. By the term "not with 
it", presumably Professor May refers to people who suffer from dementia 
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or senility. He seems to imply that dementia or senility are univocal clinical 
diagnoses . They are not; there are several stages of dementia and senility 
just as there are several stages of Alzheimer's disease. The most significant 
clinical symptom of these illnesses is that they are irreversible; they do not 
deprive a person of the ability to perform human acts at all stages of the 
illness. 
In asserting that people who are senile or who have Alzheimer's disease 
may still be able to perform human acts, I am not maintaining that they 
should be kept alive at all costs. As we shall see, senility or Alzheimer's 
disease may be pre-existing, subjective factors which are factored into the 
decision concerning treatment for a fatal pathology and whether the means 
to treat the pathology are proportionate or disproportionate. But to assert 
that the interpretation of Church teaching which allows for consideration 
of pre-existing subjective factors leads to neglect and death for seriously 
handicapped children and elderly people is an extrapolation with no basis 
in clinical medicine nor in ethical reasoning. 
There is one clinical condition however, which is incompatible with 
human acts. People in a medically diagnosed persistent vegetative state 
(PVS) suffer from a dysfunctional cerebral cortex and thus are unable to 
perform the bodily acts which dispose for acts of the intellect and will, that 
is, acts of cognitive affective function .20 In recent years, especially when 
commenting upon the Paul Brophy and Nancy Beth Cruzan cases, I have 
stated that because persons in PVS are unable to perform human acts, there 
is no moral obligation to keep them alive. While they are still persons, they 
do not benefit from life support.21 Moreover, patients in PVS have a fatal 
pathology. Because their cerebral cortex is dysfunctional, they are unable to 
perform the conscious acts of chewing and swallowing. 22 The pathology 
which hinders chewing and swallowing can be circumvented by artificial 
hydration and nutrition. But if the pathology is circumvented by artificial 
hydration and nutrition, the person will not regain the ability to perform 
human acts which are necessary in order to strive for the purpose of life. 
Just as a person with a dysfunctional cerebral cortex cannot perform the 
conscious actions necessary to strive for the purpose of life, so they cannot 
feel pain. 23 There is no moral obligation to prolong the lives of people in this 
condition through care or through therapy. Hence there is no obligation to 
circumvent the pathology affecting their ability to chew and swallow. 
Allowing the pathology to take its natural course does not bring on 
"starvation and dehydration." Some people, especially when writing Letters 
to the Editor, declare that Nancy Beth Cruzan was "starved to death ." This 
language brings to mind the vision of a conscious and competent patient 
being deprived of nourishment which would benefit her. But people in a 
persistent vegetative state can no longer feel pain, can no longer chew or 
swallow, and can no longer strive for the purpose of life. Moreover, when a 
respirator or artificial hydration and nutrition are removed from a patient 
who will not benefit from such therapy the intention of the agent is the 
desire to stop ineffective therapy; not to kill the patient. The cause of death 
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is the underlying pathology. 
Professor May and several co-authors believe that medical therapy is not 
burdensome or ineffective if it merely prolongs physiological function of 
persons in PVS and does nothing to restore their social and spiritual 
functions. They maintain that life in this condition is a "great benefit. "24 
Most medical professionals and "lay people" do not seem to agree. Over the 
past five years, I have asked thousands of people: "If you were in a persistent 
vegetative state, would you want your life prolonged by means of artificial 
hydration and nutrition," No one has ever said "yes." While this 
overwhelming reaction may not be a theological proof, it is an insight that 
cannot be ignored. Moreover, it makes us question iflife in this condition is 
a "great benefit". 
Finally, the clinical practice of medicine supports the ethical reasoning 
which allows for removal oflife support from patients who will not recover 
cognitive-affective function. Few physicians would state that it is their 
responsibility to prolong physiological function if it does not enable the 
patient to function at the cognitive-affective level. If physicians treat people 
in a comatose condition, it is with the hope of restoring some degree of 
cognitive-effective function. 25 That medicine has more in mind than mere 
physiological function is affirmed by contemporary authorities in the field. 
Leon Kass describes the purpose of medicine in this way: "Healing is thus 
the central care of medicine: to heal the whole is the doctor's primary 
business . . . that wholeness means a certain well-working of the enlivened 
body and its unimpaired powers to sense, think, feel, desire, move, and 
maintain itself . ... "26 
Pellegrino and Thomasma offer the following definition of medicine: 
"We have defined the end goal of medicine as a right and good healing 
action for a particular patient .. . The aim of medicine is to address not only 
the bodily assault that disease or an injury inflicts but also the 
psychological, social, even spiritual dimensions of this assault. To health is 
to make whole or sound, to help a person reconvene the powers of self and 
return, as far as possible to his conception of a normallife."27 
Quality of Life 
The second assumption underlying Professor May's opInion is that 
removing life support should not be based upon "quality oflife" decisions. 28 
Others seeking to apply the Catholic tradition to cases concerning the 
removal of life support maintain this position even more strongly.29 The 
main difficulty in regard to this assumption is that Professor May and 
others use the term quality of life as though it were a univocal term having 
only one meaning. This leads Professor May to confuse the norms for care 
of disabled people with care of those who will not benefit from therapy. 
Actually, quality oflife is an analogous term and has at least three different 
meanings.30 All three meanings of the term imply that a person suffers from 
impaired human function . But the circumstances of the persons with 
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impaired functions differ considerably. In one sense of the term persons 
with genetic or acquired disabilities are said to have a "diminished quality of 
life" because they cannot perform actions in a "normal" manner. Even 
though these persons have physical or mental disabilities they are not 
necessarily suffering from a fatal pathology. The term quality of life is also 
used to refer to people who have impaired function precisely because they 
are suffering from a fatal pathology. Thus , someone with cancer of the 
brain would not function in a normal manner, and would have a diminished 
quality of life, precisely because of the pa~hology from which he or she 
suffers. Thirdly, quality oflife is used when referring to people who have less 
than normal function , who also have a fatal pathology, but whose impaired 
function is not the result of the fatal pathology. Thus, an infant with Down 
Syndrome (impaired function), may also suffer from duodenal atresia (fatal 
pathology). 
The decision to withhold or withdraw life support differs for people in the 
three different categories. Concerning persons in the first category; that is , 
those who are impaired but have no fatal pathology, there is no ethical or 
medical basis for making a decision to withhold the care which enables 
them to continue living. The decision to withhold or withdraw life support 
is only made when a fatal pathology is present. To withhold life support 
from people without a fatal pathology would be the same as intending their 
death. Intending (causing in the proper sense of the term) the death of 
another is always contrary to Catholic teaching. )1 Thus, when a disabled 
person has sufficient homeostasis to support life, that person is not a 
candidate for decisions concerning ordinary and extraordinary means to 
prolong life. History recounts that in some societies the cause of death was 
induced in persons with a low quality of life. Clearly, putting persons to 
death simply because they had impaired function was a heinous crime. Even 
if defended on the grounds that it eliminated the suffering of people with 
"diminished quality oflife," it constituted euthanasia. But it is irresponsible 
to equate every act of withholding life support from people with impaired 
function with euthanasia, whether active or passive. And it is equally 
irresponsible to suggest that removing life support from people with a 
diminished quality of life (i.e., impaired function) who suffer from a fatal 
pathology always implies the intention of causing their death. In the face of 
impaired function and fatal pathology, people often experience the limits of 
medicine and remove life support because they intend to remove a burden 
from the patient or realize their efforts to help the patient are no longer 
beneficial. 
For people in the second and third categories, quality oflife must often be 
considered when ethically assessing the use of life prolonging therapy. For 
example, Mom has a brain tumor. Because of the tumor, her cognitive and 
affective functions are severely impaired. She fits into the second category 
of people with a diminished quality of life. Her impaired cognitive-affective 
function is the direct result of her illness. Mom's kidneys start to fail. 
Clearly, Mom's life could be prolonged for at least a few months through 
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dialysis. But would the added time of life enable Mom to better fulfill her 
mission in life? It seems that Mom's pre-existing subjective condition 
(impaired cognitive-affective function) would justify ethically the decision 
to forego renal dialysis and thus allowing Mom to die of end stage renal 
failure. Even though we would foresee Mom's death, we would not intend 
Mom's death. Rather, we would be admitting our limits to help her strive 
for the spiritual purpose of life in the face of fatal pathology. 
People in the third category, that is, those who have impaired function 
and a fatal pathology, but whose impaired function is not the result of the 
fatal pathology, offer the most difficult ethical decisions. In these cases, we 
must attempt to discern whether circumventing or alleviating the pathology 
will enable them to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. Many infants born 
with genetic anomalies are in this category. For example, an infant suffers 
from severe neurological impairment and also has impaired pulmonary 
function. The pulmonary pathology could be circumvented. It is necessary 
to circumvent the pulmonary pathology by means of a respirator and thus 
prolong the infant's life. Applying the ethical norms of "grave burden" and 
"ineffective" therapy to infants with a diminished quality of life is more 
difficult than applying it to other persons. The prognosis for infants is 
always tinged with uncertainty and that makes decisions of this nature more 
difficult. Every neonatal care physician or nurse can cite a case when an 
infant survived and thrived, contrary to professional expectations. 
Moreover, when jUdging the future well-being of a disabled infant, we must 
not underestimate the value of human life . Adults born with genetic or 
acquired anomalies are vociferous in appealing for life support for 
debilitated infants. 
Clearly, unethical decisions have been made in regard to infants who 
have a diminished quality of life and a fatal pathology. The Baby Doe case 
in Indiana is a good example. 32 Baby Doe was a child born with Down 
Syndrome and duodenal atresia. Unless simple surgery were performed to 
correct the atresia, he would be unable to digest food and would thus die in a 
few days. Because Baby Doe had a diminished quality of life, he was 
allowed to die from the duodenal atresia. Would the therapy have been 
burdensome? No; it is performed routinely on normal infants. Would this 
therapy have been effective, that is, would the therapy have allowed Baby 
Doe to strive for the purpose of life? Yes , indeed; retarded children are able 
to perform human acts and do strive for a spiritual purpose in life. Even 
though Baby Doe died because of a pathology present in his body, not 
because of an induced pathology, there was no ethical ground for 
withholding surgery. Thus, he was a victim of passive euthanasia. 
From the foregoing discussion of "quality of life", two observations 
emerge: 
I) Quality of life is an analogous term; it is used to refer to people in 
many different conditions. The term should not be used as a weapon, as it 
often is , to imply that every decision to withhold and remove life support is 
an act of active or passive euthanasia. 
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2) As the Papal Council Cor Unum and other authorities indicate,33 the 
term quality oflife is an acceptable term when referring to subjective factors 
which will influence decisions concerning life support. But because of the 
emotional response to the term, rather than use the term "quality of life" 
when discussing ethical decisions concerning withholding or withdrawing 
life support, the term quality offunction seems more fitting because it is less 
inflammatory and more descriptive. 34 Assessing the quality of function in 
relation to striving for the purpose of life becomes important when making 
an ethical analysis concerning life support. 
Imminent Death 
A third assumption underlying Professor May's thinking is the 
conviction that life support may never be removed from incompetent 
patients unless death is imminent; and death is never considered imminent if 
human life can be prolonged through life support. Thus, unless the life 
support fails, or functions improperly, so that it imposes a grave 
physiological burden upon the patient, the life support may not be removed 
from incompetent patients. To put it another way, Professor May would 
hold that life support must be utilized as long as it will prolong life for an 
incompetent person. The cognitive-affective function of the person is 
irrelevant iflife can be prolonged. Professor May does not refer explicitly to 
this assumption in his recent article, but it serves as a basis for his thought in 
another article co-authored with a spectrum of theologians. 35 Often the 
same thought is expressed in the words: "The patient is not dying, therefore 
life support cannot be removed." However, Catholic tradition has never 
limited the removal oflife support to situations in which the patient is dying. 
Rather, Catholic tradition allows the questions of burden and effectiveness 
to be asked when a fatal pathology is present, whether death is imminent or 
not. 36 
The assumption that life support may be removed only if death is 
imminent seems to be derived from a popular legal interpretation of the 
term "terminal illness". The interpretation in question results principally 
from laws and prevalent court decisions but people in non-legal professions 
often accept the interpretation. In the Cruzan case for example, the 
Missouri Supreme Court offered as one argument for continuing artificial 
hydration and nutrition for Nancy Beth Cruzan, the statement "that Nancy 
was not in a terminal condition," meaning, that she would not die in the 
foreseeable future because the life support circumventing her fatal 
pathology would continue to prolong her life.J7 The Missouri Court used 
the legal definition of terminal illness usually contained in its Living Will 
Legislation. Thus terminal illness was considered an illness which would 
lead to death in the immediate future even iflife support had been applied. 
According to this interpretation, if life support has been applied and is 
successful, the patient's death is no longer imminent. Thus the illness in 
question is not considered a terminal illness. This mode of thinking leads 
May, 1991 21 
some physicians, often fearing legal liability, to continue life support long 
after it is beneficial for the overall well-being of the patient. It also leads 
several anti-euthanasia activists to protest the death of any person, no 
matter what the quality of function, who could be kept alive. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently clarified this mis-
understanding by redefining the meaning of "terminal illness" at least 
insofar as the State of Illinois is concerned. In the Greenspan case (1990), 
the Court pointed out that the usual legal interpretation of terminal illness 
leads to a vicious circle, renders living wills meaningless and makes it 
impossible for compassionate care for people unable to benefit from 
therapy. The Court declared: "If the very delay caused by the procedures 
were allowed to govern the assessment of imminence, the (Living Will) Act's 
definition of a terminal illness would be rendered circular and meaningless. 
Imminence must bejudged as iJthe death delaying procedures were absent. 
The implication of this statement is found in the Court's statement: "With 
feeding tubes, patients have been known to live for years in a chronic 
vegetative state; such a fact is irrelevant. "38 (emphasis added) 
This interpretation of terminal illness and imminent death which calls for 
an evaluation of the illness "as if the death delaying procedures were 
absent", is more in accord with the teaching of the Church. In Catholic 
teaching, the "imminence" of death is not per se a requisite for the ethical 
decision to remove life support. A person could refuse surgery to remove a 
serious cancer, and still live a long time after the cancer has been diagnosed. 
Surely, the imminence of death may be utilized as one of the factors in 
determining whether therapy is an excessive burden or ineffective; that is, 
whether therapy will affect one's ability to strive for the purpose of life. 
However, the ethical decision to withhold or withdraw life support might be 
made even if death is not imminent.39 In the Catholic tradition, removal of 
life support does not hinge upon a determination that a person is dying or 
that death is imminent. Rather, the central issue in this tradition is whether 
or not the therapy needed to overcome or alleviate the fatal pathology will 
impose a grave burden or will be ineffective, subjective and pre-existing 
factors being considered. Or to put it another way: Will prolonging life 
benefit the patient insofar as the spiritual purpose of life is concerned? 
The conviction that life must be prolonged at all costs, and that the only 
way we can show our respect for human life and our love for others is to 
prolong life, no matter how impaired their capacity to function , seems a bit 
out place when compared to Catholic teaching in regard to death and 
resurrection. One contemporary author maintains the emphasis upon 
keeping people alive at all costs is a sign of the secularization of Catholicism 
in the United States.40 According to Catholic faith, death is not the end of 
existence and our life on earth is the beginning of eternal life. As Rahner put 
it: "Man cannot understand his present in any other way except as the 
beginning and the coming to be of a future and in the dynamism toward it. 
Man understands his present only insofar as he understands it as the 
approach toward and the opening up of a future."41 Suffering and death, 
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which no one can avoid in this life are realities which can be transformed 
into the fullness of human life. Hence, allowing a person to die when 
continued therapy is no longer beneficial is not abandonment, nor does it 
bespeak a lack of respect and love, which Professor May seems to suggest. 
Our efforts as Christians, it seems, should be directed toward accepting 
death and demonstrating our hope in God's gift of eternal life; not by trying 
to force every last second out of human life. The emphasis upon prolonging 
life at all costs seems to consider the "good" of human life as something 
apart from the person who is living it. Professor May's insistence that "life is 
never a burden" seems also to separate the "good of human life" from the 
way people experience their lives. When he says "life is never a burden", he 
wishes to prove that suicide and euthanasia are never justified. This is 
accepted Catholic teaching. But the basis for this teaching is the nature of a 
person's relationship to God the Creator, not the thought that "life is never a 
burden" or that "life is a good of and for the person."42 
Authors in Agreement 
The opinion which directs analysis of medical means to the spiritual 
purpose of life and which maintains that the pre-existing, subjective 
conditions affecting the function of the patient may be considered when 
determining whether or not life support should be utilized is not innovative 
or radical, as Professor May implies. For example, Gerald Kelly, writing in 
1958, declared: "As I said many physicians believe that a more moderate 
standard may be followed ... They try to preserve life as long as the patient 
himself can reap any tangible benefits from the prolongation. But they also 
think there is a point when such efforts become futile gestures . .. The 
moderate standard . .. seems to be very much in accord with the traditional 
policy of Catholic theologians of interpreting obligations according to a 
reasonable limit . . . Finally, it seems evident that the moderate standard is 
less likely to impose the excessive burdens on the patient's relatives. 
Relatives often endure terrific strains and undergo great expense while life is 
being prolonged by artificial means, and in some cases, the terminal coma; 
little good seems to be accomplished."43 
Thomas O'Donnell, S.l. in 1976 stated that commonly available 
techniques of modern surgery and medicine should usually be utilized. But 
he adds: "These techniques need not be utilized in some circumstances. The 
relation of their use to the remaining potentiality of what we have called the 
'fundamental context of human life' should be the basis of the moral 
judgment as to whether such modern means must be used or not."44 
O'Donnell's "fundamental context of human life" is similar to the spiritual 
purpose of life.45 
Finally, Francis deVittoria, writing in the 16th century, describes a 
pre-existing psychological condition which determines whether or not a 
person must use food to avoid death. He stated: "If a sick man can take food 
with a certain hope of life, he is held to take the food . But if his spirits are 
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depressed and his appetitive powers are so disturbed that eating food 
becomes a torture, it would be considered an impossibility for the man to 
take food. Hence, he would be excused, at least from mortal sin, especially 
where there is little hope of prolonging life.46 
Conclusion 
Certainly, one may follow the opinion that life must be prolonged as long 
as possible, apply the terms "grave burden" and "useless" without referring 
them to the spiritual goal of life, and demand that life support never be 
removed unless the patient is "terminal" and still be within the Catholic 
tradition. But a more extensive interpretation of Catholic teaching is also 
consistent with the Catholic tradition and does not seem to be "erroneous, 
mischievous, dangerously mistaken, nor seriously deficient." Rather it 
seems to be in accord with the Church teaching, and is traditional in the 
sense that it has been accepted through the years in clinical situations by 
families, physicians and theologians. It seems, therefore, an acceptable and 
workable interpretation of the Catholic tradition would: 
I) consider the pre-existing subjective conditions of the person when 
discerning whether therapy to overcome or alleviate a fatal pathology 
imposes a grave burden or is ineffective; 
2) use the spiritual purpose of life to assess grave burden and ineffective 
therapy; 
3) allow the withdrawal of life support even if life could be prolonged, 
provided there is a grave burden which would impede pursuing one's 
mission in life or provided the therapy is ineffective insofar as helping a 
person strive for the spiritual purpose of life. 
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